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HEADQUARTERS 12TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
25TH INFANTRY BRIGADE
AF 01 96223


COMBAT AFTER ACTION REPORT

(PHASE II)

11 JUN 68 - 16 FEB 69

Montell
T. W. ...

FIRE BRIGADE



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Regraded Unclassified
from Classified

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 2D BRIGADE, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 96225

AVDCSB-C

10 March 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3 K-1)

Commanding General
25th Infantry Division
ATTN: Division Historian
APO 96225

1. (U) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 010001 June 1968 - 162400 February 1969.
3. (U) Location: Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Tay Ninh Provinces, Republic of Vietnam.
4. (U) Control Headquarters: 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Colonel H.S. Long Jr.
6. (C) Task Organization:

1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (M)
1st Battalion, 27th Infantry
2d Battalion, 12th Infantry
2d Battalion, 14th Infantry
2d Battalion, 27th Infantry
2d Battalion, 34th Armor
3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry
3rd Battalion, 22d Infantry
3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry
4th Battalion, 9th Infantry
2d Battalion, 3rd Infantry
3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry
65th Engineer Battalion

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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1st Battalion, 8th Artillery
C Battery, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery
B and C Batteries, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery
3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery
B and C Batteries, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
B and C Batteries, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery
C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery
C Battery, 2d Battalion, 319th Artillery
38th Scout Dog Platoon

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
- a. Artillery support.
 - (1) Units.
 - (a) Direct support: 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery fired in direct support of the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
 - (b) General support:

C Battery, 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery
B and C Batteries, 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery
A, B, C and D Batteries, 3rd Battalion, 13th Artillery
B and C Batteries, 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery
B and C Batteries, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery
C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 197th Artillery
C Battery, 2d Battalion, 319th Artillery
 - (2) Artillery was employed in Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II, to provide:
 - (a) Landing zone preparations.
 - (b) Suppressive fires.
 - (c) Counter-mortar fires.
 - (d) Suppression of sniper fire.
 - (e) Destruction of attacking enemy forces (direct fire).
 - (f) H and I fires.
 - (g) Smoke and screening fires.

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- (h) Marking rounds for location.
- (i) Illumination.
- (3) 309,744 rounds of 105mm, 155mm and 8 inch artillery were fired in support of 2d Brigade operations and Vietnamese units within the Brigade TAOI.

b. Army Aviation: The four (4) organic OH-23's were exchanged for four (4) OH-6A's. The aircraft were used on a daily basis by the battalions for command and control, liaison and reconnaissance missions. During the period, the aircraft flew a total of 3855 hours, consisting of 8040 tasks, 14,071 sorties and 14,018 passengers carried. The 25th Aviation Battalion provided a UH-1D command and control helicopter to the Brigade Commander. The Brigade Commander used the C&C extensively for controlling multi-battalion operations, making command visits, and observing tactical operations. The Brigade utilized one or more assault helicopter companies on 211 days of Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II. The helicopter companies were normally furnished by the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. The assault helicopter companies were used primarily to conduct combat assault and eagle flights. CH-47's, allocated daily by II Field Force, resupplied the battalions during Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II. A total of 1681 CH-47 sorties were utilized during the operation to move 1944 tons of Class I through V supplies, personnel and mail to the forward areas. UH-1D's performed several emergency resupply missions on a quick and timely basis.

c. Air Support (USAF)

- (1) General:
 - (a) Tactical fighter bombers from the 7th Tactical Air Force were used to support 2d Brigade operations. The Forward Air Controllers were from the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron. Night operations were supported by Spooky, Shadow and Moonshine of Bien Hoa Air Force Base.
 - (2) 2019 fighter sorties were flown by tactical fighters within the Brigade TAOI; 1569 of these strikes were pre-planned sorties. 450 of the strikes were immediate request sorties in support of troops in contact.

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(3) The following is the results of the tactical fighter strikes:

	Destroyed	Damaged	Uncovered
Bunkers	3056	456	328
Trenches (meters)	3980	1402	2836
Fighting Positions	1304	384	
Structures	337	96	
Secondary Explosions	248		
Secondary Fires	132		
Killed by Air	303 VC (BC), 493 VC (POSS)		

d. Chemical Operations:

(1) Chemical operations in support of Operation TOAN THANG II, included tactical and persistent CS drops, defoliation missions, and "Sniffer" missions flown by the 9th Chemical Detachment in support of the 2d Bde Operations.

(2) Defoliation missions have been flown in 2d Bde areas of operation to clear vegetation bordering roads, paths, trails and waterways (Oriental and Saigon Rivers), thus reducing possible sites from which friendly forces may be ambushed; revealing enemy trails, supply route or installations in forested areas; clearing vegetation from fields of fire and avenues of approach; clearing vegetation surrounding Cu Chi Base Camp and other critical installations.

(3) Persistent CS drops from CH-47's have been made in areas of the lower Boi Loi, upper HoBo Woods and the Cape Canaveral area. Enemy routes of infiltration, trails, LOC's, suspected tunnels and bunker complexes, and suspected rocket launching sites, have been the primary targets of CS drops made in support of 2d Bde.

(4) Of particular interest was the use of CS in tunnel device operations. The 1-5 Infantry (M) encountered large tunnel complexes which were considered too large to be effectively flushed by the Mity-Mite blower. On this situation 55 gallon drums of CS were made available to the 2d Bde. The 10 pound sacks of CS were placed inside the tunnel complex, spaced about 20 meters apart, all charges and sacks were connected

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simultaneously. This method sealed the tunnel, trapping the CS inside, effectively denying the tunnel to the enemy.

8. (C) Intelligence:

a. Enemy units during the initial stage of Operation TOAN THANG II were scattered and in a general phase of regrouping. There was sporadic contact but no indication that he had the ability or resources to launch a major offensive.

b. As the brigade AO enlarged toward the northwest, the movement and positions of the enemy forces became more canalized into the areas of the Filhol, HoBo Woods and the Citadel. Contact with small elements continued and harrassing tactics in the form of mortaring and hit and run attacks were prevalent.

c. During the month of September, stronger, better armed forces were encountered. The majority of contacts were made with local VC forces. There was continuous evidence of resupplying and construction of defensive positions by the enemy. In October, FSB KEENE received a ground attack though not by a force large enough to over run it. In the Citadel area, there was a coordinated attack on A & D 2-12 Inf between 101800 and 11-1800. In both cases, the enemy did not commit himself in a decisive way. There was evidence of more NVA soldiers making contact, though no main force NVA units could be pinpointed.

d. In December, the 88th Regiment was identified as a subordinate of SR-2. The area of operations for the 88th was the Citadel-Hoc Woods. The 7th Bn, Cu Chi, was operating in small units and the 268th Regiment was dispersed in the lower Boi Loi Woods.

e. On 11 December, two PW's identified their units as the 268th Regiment and gave a location of XT5333316 (lower Boi Loi Woods). Interrogation indicated that no large scale attacks were planned for the immediate future. In the southern portion of the brigade AO documents and agent reports indicated the presence of elements of the 267 and 242 battalions. Agent reports and captured documents also indicated that the 272 Regt was located in the Angel's Wing area; that it had moved south from its previous location west of Tay Ninh. Southeast of this area along the eastern side of the Oriental River, captured PW's and documents identified the 2642 Bn. Enemy harassment through standoff attacks of mortar and rocket fire throughout the brigade AO was prevalent.

f. On 3 February a PW stated that the local units in Hoc Mon were to assist in the movement of the 101st NVA Regt. towards Saigon, generally following the Saigon River from the Dau Tieng area down through Hoc Mon. Other units identified in early February were the 242 Bn, with its headquarters in Ba Thu, Cambodia but operating in the Duc Hue area, and continued identification of the 268th Regt. in the Citadel area.

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g. At the end of Operation TOAN THANG II, there was still evidence of main force units in the brigade AO. The 268th Regt and the 88th Regt had taken heavy losses but were receiving replacements from North Vietnam through the Fishhook area. Local Force guerillas, though sustaining continued losses still had the capability to harrass military installations and terrorize many sections of the civilian community. In turn, there were still adequate numbers of civilians who were either neutral or sympathetic to the local forces to permit concealment and resupply.

9. (C) Mission: 2d Brigade conducts offensive operations in TAOI commencing 1 June 1968 to:

a. Frustrate enemy plans, locate and destroy VC/NVA forces, base camps and support areas.

b. Defend Phu Cuong, Ba Bep and Trang Bang Bridges.

c. Clear and secure MSR's.

d. Execute Pacification program (after 25 Oct "Colors Up").

e. Conduct VGI operations.

f. Develop targets for B-52 and persistent CS strikes.

g. Conduct combined offensive operations in conjunction with 25th and 5th ARVN Infantry Divisions throughout TAOI to destroy enemy forces.

h. Interdict movement by VC/NVA forces through the TAOI through various corridors by extensive activities within the corridors.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: 2d Bde in conjunction with the 25th ARVN Div, RF/PF units and National Police conducted combined and unilateral offensive operations within the TAOI to pre-empt VC/NVA initiatives, to interdict his lines of communications and to counter enemy initiatives.

11. (C) Execution:

a. The month of June saw daily contact with small enemy units. Almost daily, elements of the 2d Brigade were locating and destroying small caches, thus maintaining a strong and persistent offensive against the enemy. A major contact was sustained on 17 June vicinity XS7499. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry were located in a night laager which received a main attack by an estimated NVA battalion, employing small arms, RPG's, automatic weapons and 60mm mortar fire. Immediately the US troops returned fire with organic weapons, artillery, gunships and a "Spooky". The NVA Battalion had to withdraw, leaving 67 NVA (BC) and a large amount of enemy weapons, munitions and personal gear.

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b. The month of July was characterized by a limited number of contacts with the enemy. The enemy had been defeated during his May offensive and was generally avoiding major contact throughout the TAOI. On the afternoon of 8 July, Co C 1st Bn, 27th Infantry, discovered a large cache vic XT799124. The cache contained 238x60mm rds, 18x82mm rds, 4 boxes of medical supplies, and other assorted small arms ammunition.

c. The month of August was uneventful with respect to actual contact. The enemy was evasive and unwilling to make contact. However, the 2d Brigade kept the offensive by locating several caches during the period. The 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, on 4 Aug, located a large munitions cache vic XS645994 in a canal. A thorough search uncovered 17x107mm rockets complete, 16x75mm RR rds, 22 CHICOM anti-tank mines and 56 pounds of CHICOM TNT. On 7 Aug 68, another cache was found vic XT747210 which revealed 139x75mm RR rds. On still another occasion on 17 Aug 68 the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, vic XT743192 located 3 unusual dirt mounds approximately 2 feet high. A probe into these mounds uprooted 107 RPG-2 rds, 140x82mm rds, 23x75mm RR rds, 50x5 foot pieces CHICOM bangalore torpedos, 29 CHICOM anti-tank mines, 500 rds .51 cal ammo, 300 # blocks CHICOM TNT and 28,500 rds 7.62 ammunition.

d. The month of September produced no significant contacts. The enemy conducted small unit -size harassing actions. The largest cache of the month was found on 27 September when elements of the 3d Battalion, 49th ARVN Regiment, supporting the 2d Brigade, located 104x75mm RR rds, 282 60mm rds, 281x82mm rds, 3 cases of CHICOM grenades, 21 anti-tank mines and 3 cases of AK ammunition.

e. The enemy continued to avoid major contact during the month of October. On 1 October while combat assaulting into the northern HoBo Woods, B and C Companies, 2-12 Infantry, observed five VC running into two tunnels and engaged with organic weapons, LFT, and CS gas. After killing 14 VC and taking 11 VC (POW), Co B, 2-12 Inf, located a huge cache of the 7th Cu Chi Battalion Rear Detachment. The cache partially camouflaged, was located vic XT589277 and contained 87x82mm rds, 29 cases of RPG-2 rds, 30 cases of AK ammo, 73 bangalore torpedoes, 15 cases 60mm ammo, 7 pistols of assorted types, 1x60mm mortar, 5 lbs of documents, 66,000 VN plasters, and 1 complete surgical kit. On 10 Oct 68, units from the 2-12 Inf, 2-27 Inf and 4-9 Inf made contact with an estimated battalion sized enemy unit vicinity XT531224 and continued contact until 2000 hrs, resulting in 26 VC KIA and 85 VC KIA (poss). Throughout October the 2-14 Infantry conducted intensive VCI operations within the My Hanh area of Duc Hoa District. The battalion was very successful in destroying the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the area. The intense work in this area brought forth many caches and Chieu Hoi's.

During one day 3 VC's rallied under the Chieu Hoi Program to the battalion. The three ralliers led the 2-14 Inf to DAK-47's, 1 US carbine, 4 RIG - 2 RL's, 2 RPG-7 rds, and 600 rds small arms ammo. The following day two more VC rallied to the government at the same location.

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f. November had several cache finds which usually consisted of large quantities of rice and medical supplies. The major contact of the month took place at 0130 on 28 November 1968. Elements of the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, vic XT334151 were engaged by small arms, RPG fire, automatic weapons and 60mm mortar fire. Fire was returned immediately with organic weapons and artillery. The enemy withdrew, leaving 36 VC KIA, 3 CHICOM light machine guns, 2 RPG-2 launchers, 10 AK-47's, 7 RPG-7 launchers and 25 rifle grenades.

g. December started with a large cache discovery by the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, vicinity XT613292. The cache contained 128x82mm rds, 43 cans of charges, 30 RPG-7 rds and 54 RPG-2 boosters. Numerous light contacts took place during the remainder of the month.

h. During January the enemy avoided contact throughout the TAOI.

i. The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry (Mechanized), on the 2d of February, found a large rice and food cache in vic XT524223: 24,000 lbs of unpolished rice and 20 cans of fish. On Feb, while sweeping through the upper Filhol Plantation, the 2d Battalion, 34th Armor, discovered a large weapons cache vic XT639218. The following items were found: 50x122mm rockets, 40x122mm boosters, 23x122mm mortars, 20x107mm rockets, 45x82mm mortar rds, 43 boxes of C-4, 34 RPG-7 rds, and 5 cases of CHICOM grenades.

j. Detailed summary of execution is attached for periods:

(1) 1 Jun 68 - 30 Sep 68 (Incl 1)

(2) 1 Oct 68 - 16 Feb 69 (Incl 2)

12. (C) RESULTS:

a. Enemy losses:

(1) Personnel

VC/NVA KIA (BC)	1797
VC/NVA KIA (FOSS)	876
VC/NVA POW	303
Chieu Hoi's	17
Detainees	1425

(2) Equipment	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Total</u>
Individual Wpns	634	153	787
Crew Served Wpns	51	19	70
RPG Wpns	97	31	128

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(3) Munitions:

	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Total</u>
122mm Rkts (compt)	56	3	59
122mm Warheads	36		36
122mm Rkt Mortar	47		47
107mm Rkts Complete	79		79
107mm Warheads	6		6
120mm Mortar		1	1
82mm Mortars	1014	614	1628
82mm Fuzes	304	143	447
75RR	283	41	324
60mm Mortar	649	460	1109
60mm Fuzes	150	113	263
57RR		4	4
RFG-7 (B-41)	531	257	788
RFG-7 (Boosters)	279	226	505
RFG-2 (B-40)	864	671	1535
RFG-2 (Boosters)	154	134	288
14.5mm MG		100	100
12.7mm MG	250		250
.51 Cal	2400	1217	3617
.50 Cal	250	1100	1350
.45 Cal	76	230	306
9mm	48	109	157
.38 Cal		150	150
CHICOM (7.62 Long)	36450	3770	40220
7.62 (Short) (AK)	146433	21986	168419
.30 Cal	1100	5950	7050
750 lb Bomb		4	4
500 lb Bomb		5	5
250 lb Bomb		7	7
CBU		94	94
8" rd		6	6
155mm		47	47
106mm RR		70	70
105mm		70	70
4.2 Mortar		13	13
90mm (HE)		4	4
90mm RR		2	2
81mm Mortar		22	22
M-72 LAW	27	97	124
AT Mines	147	167	313
AO Mines		42	42
Home Made Mines		17	17
US Claymore (M-18A1)	7	18	25
CHICOM Directional Mines	7	71	78

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	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Total</u>
Rifle Grenades	30	108	138
AT Grenades	12	48	60
US Hand Grenades	42	178	220
CHICOM Handgrenades	727	846	1573
CHICOM TNT	3181 lbs	2964 lbs	3281 lbs
CHICOM C-3/C-4	2090 lbs	2131 lbs	2303 lbs
Shape Charges		3	3
Bangalore Torpedoes	344	112	456
Detonating Cord	9'	120'	120'
Blasting Caps	1206	446	1652
Electrical Wire	3600'	280'	3880'
Time Fuze		200'	200'
Fuze Igniters	234		234

(4) Construction:

Bunkers		4275	4275
Fighting Positions		1706	1706
Tunnels		354	354
Trench		1180 mtrs	1180 mtrs
Military Structures		98	98
Punji Pits		136	136
Foot Bridges		16	16
Road Blocks		67	67

(5) Documents: 265 lbs 265 lbs

(6) Supplies:

Medical Supplies	172 lbs		172 lbs
VC/NVA Uniforms	87	122	209
VC/NVA Webgrar	11	54	65
US Pistol Belt	30	26	56
VC Ponchos	155	177	272
VC/NVA Helmets	12	13	25
VC/NVA Gasmasks	31	17	48
VC/NVA Hammocks	124	278	402
VC/NVA misc clothing	52 lbs	50 lbs	104 lbs
Sandals	45 pr	57 pr	102 pr
VC/NVA Canteens	110	527	627
VC/NVA Medical Bags	7	28	35
VC/NVA Entrenching tools	18	28	46
VC/NVA Picks	30	11	41
Machetes	97	18	115
Knives	2	5	7
Flashlights	7	6	13
Flashlight Batteries	109	12	121

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	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Total</u>
AK Magazines	186	101	287
RFD Drums	74	47	121
Military Radios	11		11
Civilian Radios	9		9
Antenna	2		2
Field Phones	4	3	7
Commo Wire	3100'	2735'	5835'
Sampans		117	117
Samp an Motors	6		6
Bicycles	5	10	15
Motorsecooters	1		1
Automobiles		1	1
Fiasters (GVN)	77831\$		77831\$
Rice	283230 lbs	21729 lbs	304959 lbs
Fish		41 cans	41 cans
Salt	3750 lbs	1100 lbs	4850 lbs
Peanuts	100 lbs	250 lbs	350 lbs
Cooking Oil		50 gals	50 gals
Condensed Milk	200 cans		200 cans
Cooking Utensils	12 lbs	17 lbs	29 lbs
Stoves		10	10
Sewing Machines	12	2	14
Typewriters	3	3	6
Carbide lamps	4	3	7
Tabacco	750 lbs		750 lbs

(7) Miscellaneous:

Captured 12 aiming stakes, 3x60mm mortar sights, 3x60mm mortar baseplates, 1 loudspeaker, 1x82mm mortar baseplate, 40 cartons VN cigarettes, 2 watches, 2 US compasses, 3 snorkels, 4 innertubes, 2 RFG-7 sights, 1x50 cal MG Tripod, 2 pair binoculars, 1 tape recorder, 1400' nylon rope, 200 lbs surgical soap, 2 letters, 4 IRC 25 batteries, 2 VC flage, 2 NVA flage, 1 Russian flag, 1x60mm mortar cleaning kit, 1x2 1/2 HP generator, 1x3 HP engine, 30' claymore wire, 50 fishing poles.

b. US Casualties:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1-5 Inf (M)	39	234	273
1-27 Inf	37	86	123
2-12 Inf	44	242	286
2-14 Inf	32	259	291
2-27 Inf	57	308	365
2-34 Armor	0	19	19
3-4 CAV	13	89	102
3-22 Inf	3	24	27
3-187 Inf	11	57	68
4-9 Inf	20	135	155

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	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2-3 Inf	11	28	39
3-17 CAV	2	0	2
C/65 Engr	9	21	30
1-8 Arty	1	43	44

c. US Combat Losses of Major Items from 1 Jun 68 - 16 Feb 69.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>1-5</u>	<u>2-12</u>	<u>2-14</u>	<u>2-27</u>	<u>2-34</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
M113A1, APC	83				1	84
1/4-Ton Truck	1			1		2
2 1/2-Ton Truck	1			1		2
5-Ton Truck	1					1
5-Ton Wrkr				1		1
M-48 Tank					13	13
M-60	35	4				39
.50 Cal MG	32					32
M-3A1 Sub MG .45 Cal	2				5	7
Sub MG Car. 15					5	5
M16A1	151	19	12	12	14	208
.45 Cal Pistol	33	1	2	7	18	61
M79 Grenade Launch	35	8	3	2	6	44
90mm RR	4			1		5
AN/VRC-12					3	3
AN/VRC-46	9				1	10
AN/VRC-47	6				1	7
AV/VRC-53	4				3	7
AN/GRC-125	6					6
AN/FRC-25	11	4				15
AN/PRT-4		10		5		15
AN/FRR-9		8		6		14
Starlight (HM)	20	1			3	24
Starlight (CS)	3					3
Mine Detector	3	2				5
81mm Mortar	11					11
Carrier 82mm	2				1	3
Metascope	1				1	2
Armament Sub-system	11					11
Telescope M-49	1				1	2
Searchlight					2	2
M-548					1	1
3/4-ton Truck			1			1

13. Administrative Matters.

a. Supply: During the reporting period the supply point distribution system was in effect for all major units. The supply points were located at the base camp from which major units drew all major items of equipment and supplies. Major units made unit distribution to their subordinate

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elements whenever it was practical. On some occasions, major units also employed the supply point distribution system. The resupply methods used during the period included transporting supplies from the base camp to a forward field location (fire support base) and subsequently to a forward position, i.e., night laager, hardspot and patrol base. Supplies are normally moved by surface from the base camp to the forward field location except for combat emergencies and to locations not accessible by road. Aerial resupply is conducted utilizing the CH-47 and the UH-1D. With the CH-47, loads are carried both internally and externally. Air assets are limited and difficult to obtain at times. Therefore, every effort should be made to move supplies by surface means whenever practical. During this period the basic problem consisted of a shortage of barrier and fortification material. These shortages included concertina wire, sandbags and heavy timber required for establishing overnight defensive positions. Assault troops carried more than a basic load of ammunition which consisted of the normal combat load plus the individual and crew-served weapons load. The additional ammunition requirements created a resupply problem. In most cases, combat resupply was accomplished by CH-47 or UH-1D. On several occasions, there was a shortage of claymore mines with detonating devices, trip flares and 40mm (M79) ammunition. Resupply has been hampered to some degree by a shortage of air rigging equipment which has a serviceability span of six (6) months.

b. Maintenance: Maintenance operations and support during the period, have fluctuated from fair to good. The major problem has been in the area of repair parts availability. Several combat essential items, i.e., FRC-25/77 radios, 90mm Recoilless Rifles, 81mm mortars, 4.2 inch mortars, mine detectors, and starlight scopes were deadlined in excess of 30 days due to parts.

c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation: Adequate evacuation of casualties was provided by the 159th Medical Detachment during Phase II. During major contacts with the enemy, the 159th Medical Detachment was supplemented by other helicopter medical detachments to handle the large casualty requirements. The 2d Brigade casualties were speedily evacuated to the medical facilities that had the capability of treating the type of wound involved.

d. Transportation: Organic wheeled vehicles were used to resupply fire support bases. During company sized or larger unit moves, non-organic vehicles were required. The major problems in this area were deadlined vehicles without seats and side boards which decreased the unit transportation availability and capability considerably. Also, mines were a great and continuous threat to surface transportation. Air transportation assets are limited and were used only when requirements could not be met by surface means. Due to the heavy commitment of Army Aviation support, aerial resupply could not always be satisfied on a timely basis.

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e. Communications.

(1) KY-8 Operation: Voltage required for the KY-8 is 25 volts. Field CP arrangements have used a 24 Voltage battery in conjunction with a 28V Generator. In order to insure 25 Volts for the KY-8, 30 Volt battery service is necessary and will eliminate unsatisfactory secure voice operation.

(2) AN/TRC-25 Long Antenna, AT-271: There has been a tendency to throw away the Long Antenna AT-271 when the nylon cord breaks. The antenna can be saved by using field wire W001 as a substitute.

(3) Antenna R-292: Improved Communications has been achieved by the proper construction of the 292 Antenna when erected to comply with the frequency ranges the Antenna has been designed for. Mutual interference has been eliminated when antennas were properly erected.

f. Aviation: The suggested USARV Flying Hour Program, based on the DA, USAAVCOM Program of 60 hours per month per OH-6A helicopter is unrealistic. Due to the fact that logistical support (i.e., POL, major components, parts, etc.) for scheduled maintenance is based on that figure, actual flying hours per OH-6A within the 2d Brigade and the 25th Infantry Division, coupled with unscheduled maintenance caused by the environmental conditions and rigors of combat, result in increased downtime and delays which detract from the performance of the combat mission. (see chart below).

OH-6A

Month	# A/C	% Operationally ready		Average Hours per A/C		
		Div	2d Bde	Div	2d Bde	
1968	Div	2d Bde	Div	2d Bde	Div	2d Bde
Aug	20	4	78.4	82.4	93	108
Sep	21	4	88.7	93.0	90	118
Oct	20	4	78.4	82.4	93	108
Nov	19	4	83.2	78.8	100	131
Dec	29	4	87.4	89.5	99	133
1969						
Jan	28	4	76.1	64.1	133	114
Feb	34	4	78.0	64.0	106	112

14. Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. Scout and Tracker dogs were used extensively throughout the reporting period. The employment of the scout dogs was mostly at night with platoon and section size ambush patrols. This technique proved to

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be very effective because of the dog's ability to alert on possible VC/NVA movement or ambush sites. Scout dogs were also employed during daylight RIFs on the point. The utilization of scout dogs on the point was very effective in detecting booby traps or possible VC tunnels if the VC had been in the area within a two day time period. Tracker dogs were used extensively after contacts for the purpose of tracking wounded VC/NVA and along routes of withdrawal for possible VC/NVA sanctuaries.

b. During the period 20-29 January 1969, one of the maneuver battalions conducted Airboat operations in and along swamp areas which consisted of the following: Reconnaissance in force, search operations and resources control. The purpose of the operation was to destroy VC/NVA forces, interdict movement and uncover supply caches. The operation proved to be successful and essential. The assignment of assets to a unit responsible for swamp areas would be invaluable. Some of the problems encountered were communication between craft and with higher elements and navigational problems without an aircraft overhead for command and control purposes. The inability of the Airboats to operate at night because of the lack of a high intensity light system hampered the operations considerably.

c. During the reporting period two Riverine operations were conducted. Concept of operations was to provide a ground reaction force to exploit contacts initiated by the US Navy between time periods of 1600-2400 hours. Upon contact the US Navy was to maintain the contact until the infantry could be employed on or near the point of contact either by air or by ATC's. Contact was made a total of five (5) times during both operations. Problem areas encountered were numerous. Artillery coverage was very inadequate at times due to the locations of the FSB's supporting the operations. Inability of the ground forces to operate because of the terrain which prevented rapid movement especially during hours of darkness. Contacts were very short and a definite target could not be pinpointed for the employment of the ground forces.

d. Joint operations were conducted throughout Operation TOAN THANG Phase II with RF/FF units and ARVN Battalions. Joint operations with the RF/FF was conducted utilizing combined forces on ambush patrols and local security RIFs. Combined operations were also conducted utilizing the CRIP and Recon platoons of all maneuver elements with the RF/FF forces. The combined operations with the RF/FF forces proved very effective and created a better relationship between RF/FF and US forces. The ARVN battalions and US battalion size elements conducted joint operations consisting of cordon and search of villages and hamlets, combat assaults into areas for search and clear and reconnaissance in force type missions. These operations were very successful in eliminating VC/NVA forces within numerous villages and hamlets and areas in close proximity thereof. This type of operation was beneficial to both forces, in that it gave both the US and ARVN Forces the chance to observe the techniques and tactics used by both forces on the combined operations.

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e. The technique of inserting troops at night, utilizing nine (9) ship lifts into preplanned landing zones, was utilized throughout the operations. This technique proved to be very effective in disrupting VC NVA movement along known infiltration and supply routes. Once on the ground, the element would move approximately 500 to 700 meters and establish a patrol base. Two ambush patrols would be employed 500 to 1000 meters from the Patrol Base. If contact was made during the night the element was reinforced with another nine-ship lift which stayed on strip alert at a secured location. Night assault landings also proved to be very effective in the securing and cordoning of villages. This method was used either early in the evening or early in the morning to prevent the VC/NVA from leaving the village or hamlet. Night combat assaults greatly enhanced the elements ability to maneuver at night with more confidence, therefore taking the night away from the VC/NVA forces within the Bde TAOR.

f. All elements within the Bde use three methods for marking and identifying their locations for air support. The primary method is the utilization of JP-4 fuel placed in a metal container filled with soil and ignited with a trip flare. The burning time for the marker fluctuated according to the size of the container but proved to be very effective during periods of long contact. The strobe light is the secondary method used to mark or identify friendly positions especially ambush patrols, when contact is made. The last method used in the event that neither strobe lights or the JP-4 container was available, were trip flares thrown from the friendly positions. This method is the least desirable because of the burning time of a trip flare and the method in which it has to be employed.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. During the TOAN THANG Campaign Phase II, intensified Civic Actions and Psychological Operations were conducted, particularly during the Accelerated Pacification Campaign from 1 November 1968 - 17 February 1969. The Civic Action Program was directed toward short-range, high impact projects (see inclosures) and designed to involve the Vietnamese people in the effort on a self help basis. Our purpose was to improve the general well-being of the populace and to clearly demonstrate the interest of the GVN to the people.

b. The most effective civic action activity was the MEDCAP II program. This program not only gave much needed medical treatment to people in remote areas, but MEDCAP personnel also helped teach and stress the importance of proper health and sanitation habits through the distribution of health leaflets, posters and other PSYOPS material. Of major importance were plague inoculations in Trung Lap Village, Cu Chi District which precluded the spreading of this dreaded disease.

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a. Civic Action Projects And Activities.

(a) Constructions:

1.	Dwellings	12
2.	Roads	231 km
3.	Churches	6
4.	Hospitals/Dispensaries	20
5.	Market Places	2
6.	Schools	36
7.	Bridges	9
8.	Well Cappings	30
9.	Underground Drains	3
10.	Hamlet Offices	6
11.	Information Stations	4
12.	Bulletin Boards	15
13.	Hamlet Signs	3
14.	Culvert Emplacement/Replacement	13
15.	Flag Poles	7

(b) Health and Sanitation:

1.	MEDCAPs and DENTCAPs	
	a. Number	599
	b. Patients	53,596
2.	Immunizations (Plague)	7,100
3.	X-Rays (For Tuberculosis)	351
4.	Hospitals/Dispensaries Aided	54

(c) Education:

1.	Schools Aided	33
2.	School Kits	15,144
3.	Volley Ball Sets	16
4.	Soft Ball Sets	7

(d) Separate Institutions:

Orphanages Aided	2
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a. Commodity Distribution:

(a) Items and Quantity

1.	T-shirts	2,800
2.	Shorts	2,600
3.	Caps	475

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<u>4.</u>	Soccer Ball (small)	1,500
<u>5.</u>	Rubber Sandles	632
<u>6.</u>	Toys	20,000
<u>7.</u>	Clothing	10,961 lbs
<u>8.</u>	Food	20,900 lbs
<u>9.</u>	Cloth	1,000 yds
<u>10.</u>	Salad Oil	13,000 gal
<u>11.</u>	Candy	4,500 lbs
<u>12.</u>	Soap	8,600 lbs
<u>13.</u>	Agricultural Kits	198
<u>14.</u>	Mid Wife Kits	25
<u>15.</u>	Tool Kits	8

g. Impact Activities:

(a) Construction:

<u>1.</u>	Lumber	216,000 bd ft
<u>2.</u>	Tar Paper	568 rolls
<u>3.</u>	Nails	2,900 lbs
<u>4.</u>	Paint	153 gal
<u>5.</u>	Tin Sheets	1,620
<u>6.</u>	Cement Culverts	135
<u>7.</u>	Cement	2,800 bags
<u>8.</u>	Gravel (laterite)	48 yds
<u>9.</u>	Sand	70 yds
<u>10.</u>	Flywood Sheets	57
<u>11.</u>	Construction Kits	61
<u>12.</u>	Bricks	4,100

(b) Barrier Materials

<u>1.</u>	Sand Bags	268,900
<u>2.</u>	Engineer Stakes	13,300
<u>3.</u>	Wire, Concertina	260 coils
<u>4.</u>	Cyclone Fence	10 rolls
<u>5.</u>	PSF, SSP	930 sheets

(c) Ammunition:

<u>1.</u>	5.56 Ball	545,000 rds
<u>2.</u>	7.62 Link	18,000 rds
<u>3.</u>	7.62 Ball	3,600 rds
<u>4.</u>	.30 Carb.	2,160 rds
<u>5.</u>	.30 Cal. Link	6,000 rds
<u>6.</u>	.45 Cal.	300 rds
<u>7.</u>	.50 Cal.	6,000 rds
<u>8.</u>	M-72 LAW	138 rds

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<u>9.</u>	M-79 Grenades	336 rds
<u>10.</u>	M-26 Frag Grenades	460 rds
<u>11.</u>	Rifle Illum. Grenade	49 rds
<u>12.</u>	Smoke Grenades	125 rds
<u>13.</u>	81mm Illum.	160 rds
<u>14.</u>	Trip Flare	288 rds
<u>15.</u>	Signal Flare	761 rds
<u>16.</u>	Claymore Mines	174
<u>17.</u>	Det Cord	1,000 ft
<u>18.</u>	C-4 Explosive	15 lbs
<u>19.</u>	Caps, Blasting	20
<u>20.</u>	Demolition Kit	2

f. Psychological Operations:

(a) Air Operations

1. Leaflets

a. Target Audience

(1)	VC	11,452,000
(2)	NVA	7,110,000
(3)	Civilian	14,099,000

2. Loudspeaker 320 hours

(b) Ground Operations

1. Leaflets 97,162

2. Loudspeaker 159 hours

(c) Evaluation of Effectiveness

1. Chieu Hoi

a. Ralliers to GVN side 231

b. Ralliers to US Forces 15

2. Persons Reporting Information

a. Mines, Boobytraps 11

b. VC, NVA Activities 3

16. Commanders Recommendation:

a. Joint operations between US, ARVN, and provincial forces are a necessity at each echelon of command. The initial loss of effectiveness due to difficulties in coordination and command and control is more than

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
compensated for by the tremendous psychological and military impact of these operations. After the initial successful operations have commenced, future endeavors with the Vietnamese forces are more easily conducted.

b. All operations must be oriented toward the existing pacification program. Pacification must not be overlooked even when the emphasis switches to strike rather than consolidation operations. Experience indicates that it is extremely difficult to reinforce a pacification program that has been supported then suddenly dropped for other tactical operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl

1. Execution period,
1 Jun 68 - 30 Sep 68
2. Execution period,
1 Oct 68 - 16 Feb 69


GERALD J. MAHALKO
Major, Infantry
Adjutant

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